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Abstract 
In this paper, we present an OLG simulation model with endogenous fertility in order to analyze the 
relationship between child benefit and fiscal burden in Japan.  
Our simulation results show that expansion of the child benefit will improve the welfare of current 
and future generations. On the other hand, our findings show that we cannot expect a significant 
long-term improvement in welfare solely from implementing a policy of increasing the consumption tax.  
If both the sustainability of the fiscal budget and the improvement of the welfare of current and 
future generations are requirements, we will need to promote a strategy consisting of such components as 
a policy-mix that includes both child benefit expansion and additional fiscal reform, i.e. increasing the 
consumption tax. Implementation of such a policy-mix could be expected to yield a higher economic 
level in the welfare of current and future generations than could be expected solely from consumption tax 
reform. 
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1. Introduction 
Developed countries currently face unprecedented demographic changes which require 
extensive reform in fiscal systems, social security systems, and other related programs. However, 
due to conflicting interests between younger and older generations, reform may be restricted. As an 
example of a pay-as-you-go pension, in order to improve the sustainability of the system, the 
government has the option of reducing the benefits to the elderly or increasing the burden on the 
working generation. Obtaining agreement on reform by both generations is often too difficult for the 
government to achieve. In this situation, some developed countries such as France have proceeded 
with the expansion of child benefit programs. These programs are expected to increase the 
population of the younger generation as a tax resource and, as result, to reduce the per capita fiscal 
burden in the future.  
    In this paper we analyze the relationship between child benefit and the fiscal burden in the 
setting of an overlapping generations (OLG) model. In the process of this analysis, it is important for 
us to distinguish between an exogenous fertility model and an endogenous fertility model. The 
reason is that recent studies have clarified that the Pareto-efficiency condition of the exogenous 
fertility model differs from that of the endogenous fertility model. First, for an exogenous fertility 
model, we use the OLG model introduced by Diamond (1965). Three types of steady states exist in 
the model: under-accumulation, golden rule, and over-accumulation. The first two steady states are 
Pareto-efficient, but the third is not. In addition, an empirical study by Abel, Mankiw, Summers, and 
Zeckhauser (1989) reports that in industrialized countries dynamic efficiency is satisfied. In a steady 
state, dynamic efficiency corresponds to under-accumulation (or golden rule). Therefore, the 
possibility that developed countries are in a state of under-accumulation seems high. In an 
exogenous fertility setting, an allocation is said to be Pareto-efficient if it is impossible to make 
some individuals better off without making other individuals worse off. For this reason, in an 
exogenous case, we cannot improve any generation’s utility while at the same time sacrificing 
another generation’s utility.  
However, recent studies clarify the properties of the competitive equilibrium with an endogenous 
fertility setting. Raut and Srinivasan (1994) and Charkrabarti (1999) analyze the properties of 
intertemporal equilibrium with endogenous fertility. Conde-Ruiz et al. (2002) and Golosov et al. 
(2004) present the definition of Pareto-efficiency criteria in an endogenous fertility framework.  
As a development of these studies, Michel and Wigniolle (2007)
2
 point out the possibility that 
under-accumulation may not be efficient in an endogenous fertility setting. This implies that some 
                                                   
2 Although there have been several approaches that endogenize fertility decisions, Michel and Wigniolle (2007) 
depend on the benchmark framework, which assumes that children are consumption goods that appear in the utility 
function of the parents. The basic articles are Becker (1960), Willis (1973), and Eckstein and Wolpin (1985). Other 
approaches depend on the literature based on the additional assumption of descendant altruism, as in Becker and 
Barro (1988) or the assumption of ascendant altruism and strategic behavior of parents, as in Nishimura and Zhang 
(1992). 
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policies could effect improvement in one generation’s welfare without sacrificing another 
generation's welfare, even when it is in an under-accumulation state near the steady state. Moreover, 
the remarkable point made by Michel and Wigniolle (2007) is to clarify that the 
Representative-Consumer efficient (RC-efficient) condition, which is a concept developed in their 
study, has a profound connection with the sign-of-inequality relationship between the child-rearing 
cost and wage rate.
3
 That is, if some policies do provide effects to this relationship, improvement in 
RC-efficiency becomes possible. Michel and Wigniolle (2007) provide proof that, by utilizing an 
OLG model with endogenous population growth, the possibility to improve RC-efficiency also 
exists in the case of under-accumulation. But they did not analyze an economy model with public 
debt. Therefore, Oguro and Takahata (2009) analyze the relationship between child benefit and fiscal 
burden, in the setting of an OLG model with both endogenous fertility and public debt, and provide 
the condition of RC-efficiency. However, they also could not analyze the relationship between child 
benefit and fiscal burden in a real economy. The reason is that the overlapping generations of their 
OLG model amount to only two: the working generation and the retired generation. To analyze the 
relationship in a real economy, it is necessary to build an OLG model with more overlapping 
generations: e.g., a model with 65 overlapping generations and endogenous fertility.  
To this end, we construct a large-scale numerical dynamic equilibrium OLG model with 
endogenous fertility, which is calibrated to the Japanese economy. And we quantitatively evaluate 
the effects of child benefit change: e.g., the effects on the welfare of multiple generations. By doing 
this, we attempt to answer whether a fundamental change in child benefit policy results in significant 
positive effects on the Japanese economy, especially in terms of the government fiscal situation. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model structure; Section 
3 presents the calibration strategy and the findings; Section 4 describes simulation results, and 
Section 5 contains concluding remarks and policy implications. 
 
2. The Model Structure 
In this section, we describe the demographic and economic structure of our model. The model 
used here is a computable general-equilibrium OLG model with perfect foresight agents, multiple 
periods, and endogenous fertility. In our model, there is a representative individual for each 
generation in the households sector. Each individual at age 20 maximizes his/her intertemporal 
utility function with consumption and number of children. The representative competitive firm has a 
standard Cobb-Douglas production technology and maximizes its profits. In our model, not only the 
goods market but also factor markets are perfectly competitive. The model has five main building 
blocks: 1) household behavior, 2) firm behavior, 3) the Government, 4) the public pension, and 5) 
market equilibrium. Details of each block follow.  
                                                   
3 The definition of “RC-efficiency” can be seen in Michel and Wigniolle (2007) or Oguro and Takahata (2009). 
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(1) Household behavior 
There is a representative individual for each generation in the household sector. We assume that 
preferences forms are the same for all agents in all generations. Moreover, each individual lives for a 
fixed number of periods. In each period of the model, the oldest generation dies and a new one enters. 
And the representative individuals maximize their intertemporal utility function with consumption 
and number of their children subject to their lifetime income. They are also assumed to be rational, 
having perfect foresight. Each generation enters the labor market at age 21, bears and brings up their 
children at ages 21 to M +20, retires at age 1Q , is granted a pension at Q , and dies at age Z . 
In addition, each supplies labor inelastically. The within-period utility function exhibits constant 
relative risk aversion, and preferences are additive and separable over time. In each region, the utility 
functions of the t th generation born in year t are specified as:
4
 
2
1
,20
1
1
1
11
1
)1(
1
21




















 jt
Z
j
j
t
t
cn
U                                         (1) 
where   refers to the weight between number of children and consumption, 
1
  the preference 
parameter of number of children, j the j th period of life,   the pure rate of time preference, and 
2
  the reverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption. The arguments of the 
utility function are the number of children (
t
n ) and the consumption per period ( jtc , ). Leisure does 
not enter the utility function since the individual’s labor supply is assumed to be exogenous.  
    In addition, we assume that the number of children ( jtn , ) whom the t th generation bears at the j 
th period of life is the following: 
tjjt
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where jp  refers to the possibility that each generation bears the children at the j th period of life 
and this parameter is assumed to be exogenous. 
Moreover, the technological progress   is assumed to be exogenous and labor embodied. We 
model age-specific labor productivity by assuming a hump-shaped age-earnings profile, i.e., a 
quadratic form of its age j, so its age-wage profile je  takes the following form: 
2
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The intertemporal budget equation of each generation is described as follows: 
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4 This is the expansion of the utility function provided by van Groezen, B., Leers, T., and Meijdam, L. (2003). If 
1
21
  
and Z=22, i.e. only two periods (working period and retired period), this utility function becomes the 
same form as that of van Groezen, B. et al. (2003). 
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where   Rtr )1(/1  refers to the factor of the present discounted value which is driven from the 
gross interest rate 
t
R  and the capital tax 
t
tr  in year t, g  is the child rearing cost at the g th 
period of life, 
t
  is the government subsidy in year t, 
t
tc  is the consumption tax rate in year t, 
t
tw  
is the labor income tax rate in year t, 
t
w is the public pension contribution rate in year t, 
t
NW is the 
net lifetime income of generation t, 
t
w is the wage rate in year t, 
t
p is the tax for pension benefit in 
year t, and 
t
q  stands for pension benefit in year t. In addition, child rearing cost is assumed to be 
proportional to net lifetime income, i.e., 
tgg
NW , where 
g
  is the constant parameter. 
Each generation maximizes its utility function (1) under the budget constraint (4). 
When , the maximization procedure differentiating the household utility function 
(2) with respect to and , subject to the individual’s lifetime budget constraint (4), yields the 
following equations concerning consumption per period and number of children.  
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If the parameter   is stable, these equations dictate the following two relationships: 1) as in 
any life-cycle model, the trade-off between current and future consumption is determined by the 
ratio of the interest rate and the time preference rate, and by the degree of risk aversion, and 2) the 
number of children declines, when the child rearing cost increases or the government subsidy 
decreases. Moreover, from these equations, the following forms can be shown: 
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where 
t
C  is the aggregated consumption in year t, and 
t
N  measures the number of the generation 
born in year t. In addition, we can also derive the following physical wealth accumulation equation: 
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where jta ,  is physical wealth asset of generation t at the j th period of life, and tPA  is the 
aggregated private asset in year t.  
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(2) Firm behavior 
The input/output structure is represented by the Cobb-Douglas production function with 
constant return to scale. The firm decides the demand for physical capital and effective labor in order 
to maximize its profit with the given factor prices of wage and rent, which are determined in the 
perfect competitive markets. 
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where 
t
Y  is output, 
 
stands for capital income share, A  is a scale parameter, 
t
K  is the 
physical capital stock, and teL ,  is the effective labor.  
We can derive two factor prices, the rate of return rt and the wage rate per unit of effective labor 
wt, by the first-order conditions for the firm’s maximum profit: 
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where 
 
is the depreciation of physical capital. 
 
(3) The public pension 
The pension sector grants a pension to the retirement generations while pension contribution is 
collected from the working generations.  
tettt
LwwP
,
                                                             (11) 
where 
t
P  stands for the aggregated pension contribution. 
The aggregated pension benefits in year t is given by the product of the population of retirement 
age, replacement rate, and average earnings of each generation during the working period 
t
W . 
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where  denotes replacement rate and tB  is the aggregated pension benefit. 
We explicitly model the public pension system as pay-as-you-go. The budget constraint of the 
pension sector can be shown as follows: 
tt
BspP )1( 
            
                                                 (13) 
where sp denotes public subsidy to pension, which is financed by government expenditure tG . 
Moreover, we assume that the public pension sector maintains a fixed replacement rate 
exogenously. As a result, in our model, the pension contribution rate is endogenously determined in 
order to keep the budget constraint (13). 
 
(4) The Government 
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The government sector has four types of taxes: wage tax, consumption tax, capital tax, and 
pension benefit tax, and the public debt issue income as its revenue and pays the consumption, 
investment, and interest payments as expenditures. 
ttttttttettt
BtpPARtrCtcLwtwT 
,                                (14) 
We keep all tax rates constant. The role of the government is to endogenously determine the 
rate of the public debt issue as a residual of government expenditure and revenue.  
1
)1(


ttttt
DrTGD                                                      (15) 
where 
t
G
 
stands for government expenditure in year t, 
t
T  denotes tax revenue in year t, 
t
D  
denotes public debt in year t. 
The public debt issue 
1
)1(


tttt
DrDBond is set endogenously due to the difference 
between expenditure and tax revenue. It should be noted that the public debt issue to GDP ratio will 
change over time as a result of possible imbalances between revenues and expenditures. Thus we 
don’t know whether the fiscal policy of a country is sustainable and whether the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint must be satisfied. 
 
(5) Market equilibrium 
Finally, in our model of a closed economy, we require the equilibrium in the financial market, 
i.e., the aggregate value of assets equals the market value of the capital stocks plus the value of 
outstanding government bonds: 
ttt
DKPA                                                               (16) 
 
3. The Data, Calibration, and Scenarios 
3.1 Data and calibration 
First, we present the values of the main parameters and exogenous variables of the model in 
Table 1. The parameter values for the households’ and firms’ behaviors are derived from Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1987) and various early OLG simulation studies in Japan.
5
 These parameters, such as 
technological and preference parameters except the weight parameter , are assumed to be constant. 
The exogenous variables such as the macroeconomic, fiscal, and public pension variables are 
derived mainly from OECD (2007) “Tax Database,” and Whitehouse (2007) “Pensions Panorama.” 
In addition, the child bearing possibility parameter is derived from the data of “Age-specific 
fertility rate,” which is provided by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 
(2007), and the parameter values of the child rearing cost and the government subsidy are derived 
from the special research report about social cost of rearing children, which is provided by the 
Cabinet Office Director-General for Policies on a Cohesive Society, Japan (2005). 
                                                   
5 See Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2001, 2003); Uemura (2002); and Ihori et al. (2006). 
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Second, by controlling the weight parameters in years 1900–2007, we calibrate our 
demographic projection to fit the data’s trend in “Population by Age (generation born in 
1900–2007),” which is provided by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications with the collaboration of other Ministries and Agencies in Japan. Figure 1 reports 
the actual values and the computed values of demographic projection. Note that actual and 
calculated values correspond closely. 
Next, in order to analyze the relationship between child benefit and fiscal burden, we start our 
calculations with a phase-in period of about 200 years in order to relax the unrealistic assumption of 
a steady state in the 2007 base year of our simulation. Moreover, since the model is simulated over 
500 periods, we ensure a sufficiently long period for a steady state to be achieved.  
Table 2 reports the actual values of some key variables in 2007 and the computed values in the 
model. Also, note that actual and calculated values correspond closely. 
 
3.2. Scenarios 
Next we present simulation scenarios. The scenarios are classified into four categories. Scenario 
1 assumes the baseline case with no expansion of child benefit, and Scenarios 2 and 3 assume 100% 
increase of child benefit after 2015. Scenario 4 assumes 50% increase of child benefit after 2015. 
Scenarios 5 and 6 assume no expansion of child benefit but an increase in the consumption tax to 
10% and 15% (consumption tax reform), respectively. Finally, Scenario 7 is the policy-mix of 
Scenario 2 (permanent expansion) and Scenario 6 (15% consumption tax reform). 
In Scenarios 2 and 4, the increase of child benefit is permanent from 2015. In Scenario 3, the 
increase of child benefit is temporal for 2015–2025.  
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 
Child benefit No increase 100% 
increase 
after 2015 
100% 
increase 
for 2015-25 
50% 
increase 
after 2015 
No increase No increase 100% 
increase 
after 2015 
Consumption 
tax 
5% 5% 5% 5% 10% 15% 15% 
 
4. Simulation results 
We now turn to describe the simulation results reported in Figures 2 to 5 and Table 3. Here we 
present the scenarios of results of the child benefit expansion in comparison to the cases of no 
expansion, the case of consumption tax reform, and the case of policy-mix (permanent expansion 
and consumption tax reform). 
   
(1) Demographic projection and macroeconomic variables 
Figure 2 shows the population projection of future generations born in 2000–2050. The 
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projection of Scenario 1 and official estimation, which is provided by the National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research (2006), closely correspond. In Scenario 2 (100% permanent 
child benefit increase), compared with Scenario 1, the population of the generation born in 2030 
increases by 143,000, in Scenario 3 (100% temporally child benefit increase) by 11,000, in Scenario 
4 (50% permanent child benefit increase) by 66,000, in Scenario 5 (10% consumption tax reform) by 
-4,000, in Scenario 6 (15% consumption tax reform) by 19,000, and in Scenario 7 (policy-mix) by 
166,000.
6
 However, in Scenario 6, the increase of the future generation is temporal. In this scenario 
compared with Scenario 1, the population of the generation born in 2050 decreases by 83,000. 
Figure 3 also shows the retired population ratio. The ratio of Scenario 1 and official estimation, 
which is provided by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2006), 
closely correspond. In Scenario 2, compared with Scenario 1, the ratio in 2050 decreases by 1.7%, in 
Scenario 3 by 0.1%, and in Scenario 4 by 0.8%. Thus it can be seen that these child benefit 
expansions slightly decrease the progress of population aging. 
As we adopt the lifecycle hypothesis, the saving rate is severely affected by the rise of the rate 
of elderly population, which is strongly correlated with the demographic trend. In Scenarios 1 to 7, 
there is no significant change in the trend of the saving rate during the simulation periods. But its 
level differs in each scenario. In Scenario 1, the saving rate shows a tendency to decrease from 
6.17% in 2007 to -11.75% in 2050. Table 3 shows that the child benefit expansions basically raise 
the saving rate in 2007 to 2040 years. On the other hand, the reform with higher consumption tax 
reduces the saving rate more in the years from 2007 to 2040.  
Because of the assumed technology and lifecycle hypothesis, the GDP is determined mainly by 
working-age population dynamics. In the baseline scenario, the GDP level grows stagnant. It 
declines markedly from 2020 to 2050, reflecting the declining labor force. And then, in each scenario, 
the GDP declines to 53.79%–58.73% in 2050 from the base year 2007. But, in Scenarios 1 to 5, GDP 
per employee increases from 2007 to 2050. On the other hand, in Scenarios 6 and 7, GDP per 
employee temporally decreases in 2015 and increases after 2020. 
Finally, we briefly valuate factor prices. In each scenario, due to the capital market equilibrium, 
the interest rate (wage rate) fluctuates within a narrow range, e.g., 2.61%–3.89% (93.55%–101.65%) 
over five decades. 
 
(2) Fiscal variables 
Generally, the child benefit expansion can be expected to give the fiscal balance ambivalent 
effects through several channels. If the expansion is financed by new public bond issues, it initially 
increases public debt. But the increase in the number of children also increases tax bases, and then 
                                                   
6 Consumption tax reform may contribute to the increase of population of future generations through the mechanism 
in that the fall in net lifetime income decreases the child rearing cost, e.g., the opportunity cost which is the net lost 
income when parents bring up a child. 
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changes the trend of government revenue and expenditure. As a result, the future government debt 
will be either reduced or increased.  
Table 3 shows that in Scenario 2, compared with Scenario 1, the Debt-GDP ratio slightly 
increases by 6.99% in 2030 and 13.18% in 2050. In Scenario 3, the ratio increases by 5.05% in 2030 
and 13.41% in 2050, and in Scenario 4 by 3.30% and 6.29% in 2050. Figure 4 also shows that in 
Scenario 2 compared with Scenario 1, the debt per employee slightly decreases by 0.04 in 2050 and 
in Scenario 4 by 0.02 in 2050. However, in Scenario 3, the debt per employee increases by 0.05.  
On the other hand, in Scenarios 5 to 7 (consumption tax reform or policy-mix), the Debt-GDP 
ratio is reduced by 58.80%–113.23% in 2030 and 326.87%–587.58% in 2050, and the debt per 
employee is reduced by 1.32–2.36 in 2050. 
 
(3) Welfare 
Figure 5 shows generational welfares of Scenarios 1 to 7. These are welfares of subsequent 
cohorts measured in terms of lifetime utility level against the cohort born in 1930. The long-run 
increase in the pension premium to wage rate caused by the progress of aging decreases the amount 
of resources available within their lifetime. The long-run increase in the public debt to GDP ratio 
also reduces private capital stock available and possibly decreases future growth. Current and future 
generations suffer a severe welfare loss.  
    In Scenarios 1 to 7 in Figure 5, we measure the welfare of each generation with equivalent 
variation. The welfares of Scenario 6 gradually decline and the bottom for this scenario doesn’t 
occur until birth year 2050, but Scenarios 1 to 4 have a welfare bottom at the generation born in 
2025; the bottom for Scenario 5 is in 2030, and for Scenario 7 it is in 1990.  
 In addition, in Scenarios 2 to 4, compared with Scenario 1, all generations born after 1990 
obtain a welfare gain: e.g., in Scenario 2, the welfare of the generation born in 2030 dramatically 
increases by 4.6%, in Scenario 3 by 0.2%, and in Scenario 4 by 2.2%. This means that the welfare 
conditions in Scenarios 2 to 4 correspond to the concept of “RC-improvement” developed by Michel 
and Wigniolle (2007). 
On the other hand, in Scenarios 5 to 7, compared with Scenario 1, most generations born after 
1940 suffer a welfare loss whose burden is covered by an increase in consumption tax. However, if 
Scenario 6 is an inevitable choice in order to maintain the sustainability of fiscal budget, we should 
change the baseline scenario from Scenario 1 to Scenario 6. Then, in Scenario 7, compared with 
Scenario 6, all generations born after 1990 obtain a welfare gain. This means that Scenario 7 also 
becomes an “RC-improvement.” 
Therefore, from the comparison between the child benefit scenarios, the consumption tax 
reform scenarios, and the policy-mix scenario, we draw the following conclusions: 1) if we can 
ignore the sustainability of the fiscal budget in Scenarios 2 to 4, the child benefit expansions are 
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expected to make some contributions to the improvement of the welfare of current and future 
generations, and 2) if both the sustainability of the fiscal budget and the improvement of the welfare 
of current and future generations are requirements, we will need to promote a policy such as a 
policy-mix with the child benefit expansion and additional fiscal reform, i.e. increasing the 
consumption tax. Then, the policy-mix can be expected to provide a higher level of welfare for 
current and future generations than only consumption tax reform. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we presented an OLG simulation model with endogenous fertility in order to 
analyze the relationship between child benefit and fiscal burden in Japan. Our simulation results 
show that expansion of the child benefit will improve the welfare of current and future generations. 
On the other hand, our findings show that we cannot expect a significant long-term improvement in 
welfare solely from implementing a policy of increasing the consumption tax. If both the 
sustainability of the fiscal budget and the improvement of the welfare of current and future 
generations are requirements, we will need to promote a strategy consisting of such components as a 
policy-mix that includes both child benefit expansion and additional fiscal reform, i.e. increasing the 
consumption tax. Implementation of such a the policy-mix can be expected to provide a higher 
economic level in the welfare of current and future generations could be expected solely from 
consumption tax reform. 
    The weakness of our study is that our model does not include the following points: 1) the effect 
of heterogeneous households with different preferences such as a child bearing parameter, 2) the 
effect of endogenous labor supply, 3) the effect of not only the child as consumption but also that as 
investment, e.g., child for “old-age annuity,” and 4) the effect of the global capital market. These 
points remain subjects for future study. 
  In addition, the Japanese government is currently trying to develop a model for estimating the 
direction of the population of future generations, which has economic underpinnings. Therefore, if 
our model can be made more robust, it may prove to have a great impact on the method for 
estimation of the Japanese population, by which we analyze the relationship between future 
population and changes in the economic environment. 
Finally, in an era of population aging, Japan will face enormous difficulties. Even given the 
difficulty of the task, Japan, like other developed countries, must confront these and other obstacles 
and solve the related issues to chart a productive and viable future for its future generations.  
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Table 1 Parameter Values of the Model 
PARAMETER  VALUE 
Utility function  
 
Time preference rate   0.01 
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution /1  2.0 
Weight parameter between children number and consumption    0.84* 
Production function   
 Technology progress   0.002 
 Capital share in production   0.3 
Physical capital depreciation   0.05 
Tax policy parameters   
Wage tax tw  20.0% 
Capital tax tr  20.0% 
Consumption tax tc  5.0% 
Pension benefit tax tp  10.0% 
Pension policy parameters   
National subsidy to pension sp  25.0% 
 Replacement ratio   50.0% 
Other parameters   
Child rearing cost to net lifetime income 
 
 
 
 0 to 5 0.78% 
 6 to 10 0.46% 
 11 to 15 0.55% 
 16 to 20 0.58% 
Child bearing possibility  
 1 to 5 3.0% 
 6 to 10 7.4% 
 11 to 15 7.0% 
 16 to 20 2.6% 
Government subsidy to child rearing cost   0.1 
Limit age of bearing child M  40 
Age of retirement Q  65 
Average life expectancy Z  85 
* This parameter is fixed after year 2007. 
  
g
  
j
p  
g=
 
j=
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Table 2 Year 2007 of the Baseline Scenario 
  OFFICIAL MODEL 
National Income (% of GDP) 
  
 Private consumption 74.1% 81.3% 
 Government purchases of goods and services 21.0% 24.3% 
Saving rate 3.1% 6.1% 
 
Government Indicators 
  
 Pension premium to wage 14.9% 14.9% 
 Gross public debt (% of GDP) 170.6% 170.6% 
 Primary balance  (% of GDP) -2.4% -4.5% 
 Tax revenues (% of GDP) 18.4% 19.8% 
 
Other Indicators 
  
 Capital output ratio 2.9 4.6 
 Interest rate 1.7% 2.6% 
Data source: Official values are derived from OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, 2008 and “Annual Report on National Accounts,” the Japanese SNA statistics (Cabinet Office). 
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Table 3 Simulation Results－Macro Economic Projection 
  
GDP 
GDP per 
employee 
Saving rate 
Capital- 
labor ratio 
Interest rate Wage rate 
Debt-GDP 
ratio 
Debt per 
employee  
Pension 
premium to 
wage  
Scenario 1 2007 100.00% 100.00% 6.17% 100.00% 2.61% 100.00% 170.65% 100.00% 14.90% 
 
2010 98.63% 101.30% 5.59% 101.82% 2.51% 100.54% 186.94% 108.02% 15.83% 
 
2015 94.49% 104.03% 5.82% 104.68% 2.37% 101.38% 219.79% 123.21% 17.37% 
 
2020 90.34% 106.21% 0.69% 105.60% 2.32% 101.65% 259.60% 141.98% 25.99% 
 
2030 80.75% 103.92% 1.16% 95.61% 2.85% 98.66% 364.40% 192.97% 26.45% 
 
2040 66.59% 102.40% 3.45% 87.25% 3.37% 95.99% 559.78% 283.55% 28.90% 
 
2050 53.79% 102.58% -11.75% 80.25% 3.87% 93.61% 936.46% 429.65% 37.35% 
                      
Scenario 2 2007 100.00% 100.00% 6.17% 100.00% 2.61% 100.00% 170.79% 100.00% 14.90% 
 
2010 98.63% 101.30% 5.59% 101.82% 2.51% 100.54% 187.15% 108.06% 15.83% 
 
2015 94.51% 104.05% 6.06% 104.74% 2.36% 101.40% 220.38% 123.46% 17.37% 
 
2020 90.33% 106.20% 0.95% 105.57% 2.32% 101.64% 261.87% 142.96% 25.99% 
 
2030 80.66% 103.81% 1.49% 95.27% 2.87% 98.56% 371.39% 194.48% 26.48% 
 
2040 66.39% 101.88% 3.99% 85.96% 3.46% 95.56% 576.67% 283.88% 29.02% 
 
2050 54.84% 102.01% -10.62% 80.07% 3.89% 93.55% 949.64% 425.09% 36.77% 
 
                    
Scenario 3 2007 100.00% 100.00% 6.17% 100.00% 2.61% 100.00% 170.77% 100.00% 14.90% 
 
2010 98.63% 101.30% 5.59% 101.82% 2.51% 100.54% 187.12% 108.05% 15.83% 
 
2015 94.49% 104.03% 6.05% 104.69% 2.37% 101.39% 220.33% 123.43% 17.37% 
 
2020 90.31% 106.18% 0.93% 105.52% 2.33% 101.63% 261.71% 142.97% 25.99% 
 
2030 80.67% 103.82% 1.24% 95.30% 2.87% 98.57% 369.45% 195.11% 26.48% 
 
2040 66.40% 102.08% 3.58% 86.37% 3.43% 95.70% 570.02% 287.17% 29.01% 
 
2050 53.95% 102.60% -12.06% 80.44% 3.86% 93.68% 949.87% 435.66% 37.34% 
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Table 3 Simulation Results－Macro Economic Projection (continued) 
  
GDP 
GDP per 
employee 
Saving rate 
Capital- 
labor ratio 
Interest rate Wage rate 
Debt-GDP 
ratio 
Debt per 
employee  
Pension 
premium to 
wage  
Scenario 4 2007 100.00% 100.00% 6.17% 100.00% 2.61% 100.00% 170.72% 100.00% 14.90% 
 
2010 98.63% 101.30% 5.59% 101.82% 2.51% 100.54% 187.05% 108.04% 15.83% 
 
2015 94.50% 104.04% 5.94% 104.71% 2.37% 101.39% 220.08% 123.33% 17.37% 
 
2020 90.33% 106.20% 0.81% 105.58% 2.32% 101.64% 260.70% 142.45% 25.99% 
 
2030 80.71% 103.87% 1.31% 95.45% 2.86% 98.61% 367.70% 193.71% 26.46% 
 
2040 66.49% 102.16% 3.70% 86.64% 3.41% 95.79% 567.67% 283.75% 28.95% 
 
2050 54.27% 102.31% -11.23% 80.17% 3.88% 93.58% 942.75% 427.62% 37.08% 
                      
Scenario 5 2007 100.00% 100.00% 6.17% 100.00% 2.61% 100.00% 170.49% 100.00% 14.90% 
 
2010 98.63% 101.30% 5.59% 101.82% 2.51% 100.54% 186.71% 107.98% 15.83% 
 
2015 92.39% 101.72% 6.86% 97.14% 2.76% 99.13% 222.73% 122.20% 17.37% 
 
2020 89.40% 105.10% -0.43% 101.98% 2.50% 100.59% 246.94% 133.75% 26.38% 
 
2030 81.08% 104.35% -2.02% 96.93% 2.78% 99.07% 305.60% 162.55% 26.65% 
 
2040 68.73% 105.66% -0.12% 96.88% 2.78% 99.05% 409.28% 214.58% 28.30% 
 
2050 54.73% 104.22% -2.92% 84.65% 3.55% 95.12% 609.59% 286.57% 36.02% 
  
                  
Scenario 6 2007 100.00% 100.00% 6.17% 100.00% 2.61% 100.00% 170.38% 100.00% 14.90% 
 
2010 98.63% 101.30% 5.59% 101.82% 2.51% 100.54% 186.51% 107.95% 15.83% 
 
2015 90.47% 99.60% 7.84% 90.56% 3.15% 97.07% 225.78% 121.38% 17.37% 
 
2020 88.56% 104.12% -1.65% 98.84% 2.67% 99.65% 235.22% 126.26% 26.74% 
 
2030 81.28% 104.60% -5.45% 97.71% 2.73% 99.31% 251.16% 133.71% 26.89% 
 
2040 69.67% 107.02% -4.70% 101.18% 2.55% 100.35% 285.97% 151.73% 28.26% 
 
2050 57.90% 109.58% -6.85% 100.40% 2.59% 100.12% 348.88% 174.13% 33.96% 
           
 
Not to be quoted without express written permission from the authors 
17 
 
Table 3 Simulation Results－Macro Economic Projection (continued) 
  
GDP 
GDP per 
employee 
Saving rate 
Capital- 
labor ratio 
Interest rate Wage rate 
Debt-GDP 
ratio 
Debt per 
employee  
Pension 
premium to 
wage  
Scenario 7 2007 100.00% 100.00% 6.17% 100.00% 2.61% 100.00% 170.51% 100.00% 14.90% 
 
2010 98.63% 101.30% 5.59% 101.82% 2.51% 100.54% 186.73% 107.99% 15.83% 
 
2015 90.49% 99.63% 8.14% 90.63% 3.15% 97.09% 226.46% 121.67% 17.37% 
 
2020 88.55% 104.11% -1.31% 98.80% 2.67% 99.64% 237.98% 127.50% 26.74% 
 
2030 81.19% 104.49% -4.99% 97.37% 2.75% 99.20% 259.50% 136.54% 26.92% 
 
2040 69.61% 106.69% -4.00% 100.36% 2.59% 100.11% 302.43% 156.29% 28.30% 
 
2050 58.73% 108.26% -5.40% 98.04% 2.71% 99.41% 371.93% 180.39% 33.57% 
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Figure 1 Demographic Projection of Each Generation 
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Figure 2  Simulation Results－Demographic Projection of Future Generation 
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Figure 3  Simulation Results－Retired population ratio 
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Figure 4  Simulation Results－Debt per employee 
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Figure 5  Simulation Results – Welfare with Equivalent Variation 
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